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Abstract
This paper addresses the problem of model-based oﬀ-line selection of test cases for testing the conformance
of a black-box implementation with respect to a speciﬁcation, in the context of reactive systems. Eﬃcient
solutions to this problem have been proposed for LTS ﬁnite-state models, based on the ioco conformance
testing theory. In this paper, the approach is extended for inﬁnite-state speciﬁcations, modelled as automata
extended with variables. When considering the selection of test cases according to test purposes (abstract
scenarii focused by test cases), the selection of test cases relies on approximate co-reachability analyses
using abstract interpretation and syntactical transformations guided by this analysis, while test execution
uses constraint solving.
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1 Introduction
Many aspects of software can be tested to assess its correctness e.g., functionality,
performance, timing, robustness, etc. Among these, the focus of this paper is on
conformance testing of reactive systems. This consists in checking that a black-box
implementation of a system, only known by its interactions with the environment
through an interface, behaves correctly with respect to its speciﬁcation. This relies
on experimenting the system with test cases, with the objective of detecting some
faults, or to improve the conﬁdence one may have in the implementation.
Automatization of some parts of the testing activity, using models of software
and formal methods is a way to improve the quality and cost of testing. For more
than a decade, model-based testing (see e.g., [5]) advocates the use of formal models
and methods to formalize this activity. The formalization relies on models of testing
artifacts, relations between them including conformance, and properties they satisfy.
For reactive systems, behavioral models are used for speciﬁcations, and serve both
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as a basis for test generation, and as an oracle for the assignment of verdicts in
test cases. Testing theories based on ﬁnite-state models such as automata (see
e.g., the survey [19]), or labelled transition systems (see e.g., [25]) are now well
understood, and gave rise to automatic test generation algorithms and tools like
TorX [2], TGV [14], Gotcha [3] among others, have been developed and successfully
used on industrial-size systems.
Some developments are still necessary to improve the automation of test gen-
eration. In particular more powerful models taking into account some aspects of
complex software must be considered such as data, time, etc. In this paper we fo-
cus on data, and models called Input/Output Symbolic Transition Systems (ioSTS)
are considered. These are automata extended with variables, with distinguished
input and output actions, and corresponding to reactive programs without recur-
sion. As their semantics can be deﬁned in terms of inﬁnite-state Input/Output
Labelled Transition Systems (ioLTS), the ioco testing theory [25], which deﬁnes
conformance as a partial inclusion of external behaviours (suspension traces) of the
implementation in those of the speciﬁcation, can be reused. The diﬃculty is in the
selection of test cases. Test cases are programs with variables, directly built from
the ioSTS model rather than from the enumerated ioLTS semantic model. This
construction relies on syntactical transformations of the speciﬁcation model, guided
by an approximate analysis. The models and principles of the test selection algo-
rithms are illustrated by a simple example of a lift controller. The test selection
algorithms described in this paper are implemented in the STG tool [16] (see http:
//www.irisa.fr/vertecs/software.html#STG). The approximate co-reachability
and reachability analyses are provided by an interface with the NBac tool [15]
(see http://pop-art.inrialpes.fr/people/bjeannet/nbac/index.html) using
abstract interpretation [8]. This work builds on previous work by our team such
as [24,17].
Related work
Several other works, done in the context of conformance testing or white bow
testing can be related to our work.
Some are based on symbolic execution [4,13] and/or constraint resolution: the
DART tool [11] combines symbolic execution with random testing and constraint
solving, the PET tool [12] uses constraint solving to produce test cases as solu-
tions to path conditions produced from a speciﬁcation and a property, the Agatha
tool [10] uses symbolic execution on a variation of the ioSTS model, the Gatel [23]
and BZ-TT [20] tools rely on constraint solving. In [21] the authors use selection
hypotheses combined with unfolding for algebraic data types and predicate resolu-
tion to produce test cases. Compared to our approach, these approaches are limited
to deterministic systems, and consider ﬁnite unfoldings of systems by limiting the
search depth in order to cope with loops, but they may produce precise test cases.
Nevertheless, these are complementary methods: test selection with test purposes
using approximate analyses can be seen as a front-end used to select an abstract
test case, where information on non-conformance is preserved. Then constraint
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solving techniques can be used to search for instantiated test cases, by limiting the
unfolding of remaining loops.
Other approaches are funded on abstractions: [6] uses TGV on an abstraction
before concretization of test cases using constraint solving, and Ball [1] uses a combi-
nation of predicate abstraction, reachability analysis and symbolic execution. Very
recently, abstract interpretation has also been proposed in the context of white box
structural testing in combination with constraint solving [9].
2 Modeling reactive systems with ioSTS
In this section, a model of reactive systems, called ioSTS for Input/Output Sym-
bolic Transition Systems, is proposed which will serve for speciﬁcations, test cases
and test purposes. This model is a kind of extended automata model, inspired by
I/O automata [22]. It is made of a set of variables (including one encoding control
locations) which encode the state of the system, and transitions with guards, input
and output actions with communication parameters and assignments of variables to
expressions.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [ioSTS ] An Input/Output Symbolic Transition System M is de-
ﬁned by a tuple (V,Θ,Σ, T ) where:
• V = Vi ∪ Vx is the set of variables, partitioned into a set Vi of internal variables
and a set Vx of external variables. Dv denotes the domain in which v takes its
values,
• Θ is the initial condition. It is a predicate Θ ⊆ DVi deﬁned on internal variables.
It is assumed that Θ has a unique solution in DVi .
• Σ = Σ? ∪ Σ! is the ﬁnite alphabet of actions. Each action a has a signature
sig(a), which is a tuple of types sig(a) = 〈t1, . . . , tk〉 specifying the types of the
communication parameters carried by the action.
• T is a ﬁnite set of symbolic transitions. A symbolic transition t = (a,p, G,A),
also written [ a(p) : G(v,p) ?v′i := A(v,p) ], is deﬁned by
· an action a ∈ Σ and a tuple of (formal) communication parameters p =
〈p1, . . . , pk〉, which are local to a transition; without loss of generality, it is
assumed that each action a always carries the same vector p, which is supposed
to be well-typed w.r.t. the signature sig(a) = 〈t1, . . . , tk〉; Dp is denoted by
Dsig(a);
· a guard G ⊆ DV × Dsig(a), is a predicate on variables (internal and external)
and communication parameters.
· an assignment A : DV × Dsig(a) → DVi , which deﬁnes the evolution of the
internal variables. Av : DV × Dsig(a) → Dv denotes the function in A deﬁning
the evolution of the variable v ∈ Vi.
This model does not explicitly deﬁne control locations, but these can be encoded
(as in the examples) by a variable pc with ﬁnite domain. One particularity of the
model is the distinction made between internal and external variables. Internal
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variables are standard variables deﬁning the state of the system itself, while external
variables are used to observe the state of another system (thus modiﬁed by this other
system). As will be seen, this allows to use the same model for speciﬁcations and test
purposes. It is assumed that guards are expressed in a theory in which satisﬁability
is decidable. We will come back later to the hypothesis of satisﬁability of guards,
which will be important during test execution.
Example 2.2 Fig. 1 describes an example of ioSTS specifying a simple lift con-
troller (the dashed edges labelled with δ are not part of the speciﬁcation and will
be explained later). The integer constant h speciﬁes the height of the building, the
integer variables c and g are initialized to 0 and respectively specify the current
level, and the target level. Wait, Move and End are control locations (values of
the pc variable). In location Wait, an input Target? is read and a level is chosen by
providing a value between 0 and h to the parameter p, then stored in g, and the lift
controller reaches Move. In location Move, if the current level c equals the target
level g, a Stop!(p) is sent with p = c. If c < g, an output Up!(p) is sent with p = c,
and c is increased. If c > g, the output Down!(p) is sent with parameter p = c, and
c is decreased. In case of breakdown, the controller may non-dterministically send
an output Break! and go to state End.
Waitc = g = 0 Move End
0 ≤ p ≤ h
Target?(p)
g := p
δ!
c = g ∧ p = c
Stop!(p)
c < g ∧ p = c
Up!(p)
c := c + 1
c > g ∧ p = c
Down!(p)
c := c− 1
Break!
δ!
Fig. 1. ioSTS speciﬁcation S of a simple lift controller example
The semantics of an ioSTS M = (V,Θ,Σ, T ) is an input/output labelled tran-
sition system (ioLTS) M = (Q,Q0,Λ,→) where:
• Q = DV is the set of states;
• Q0 = {ν = 〈νi,νx〉 | νi ∈ Θ ∧ νx ∈ DVx} is the subset of initial states;
• Λ = {〈a,π〉 | a ∈ Σ ∧ π ∈ Dsig(a)} is the set of valued actions partitioned into
valued inputs Λ?, and valued outputs Λ!;
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• the transition relation → is deﬁned by
(a,p, G,A) ∈ T ν = 〈νi,νx〉 ∈ DV π ∈ Dsig(a) ν ′ = 〈ν ′i,ν ′x〉 ∈ DV
G(ν,π) ν ′i = A(ν,π)
ν
〈a,π〉→ ν ′
(Sem)
Intuitively a state is composed of the values of internal and external variables.
The set of initial states is composed of states where the internal part is uniquely
determined by Θ, while the external part is arbitrary. Transitions are labelled by
valued actions and the set of transitions is determined by the rule (Sem): in a
state ν = 〈νi,νx〉, a transition (a,p, G,A) can be ﬁred if there exists a valuation
π of the communication parameters p such that 〈ν,π〉 satisﬁes the guard G; the
valued action 〈a,π〉 is then taken, resulting in a state ν ′ where the new values
of the internal variables are deﬁned by the assignment A, while external variables
take arbitrary values, which reﬂects the fact that their value is deﬁned by another
ioSTS. As variables may have inﬁnite domains, the semantics of an ioSTS may be
an inﬁnite-state ioLTS.
Example 2.3 The lift-controller example having no external variable, states are
composed of values of the variables pc (locations), c (current level) and g (target
level).
Notations on ioLTS
In the sequel we will use standard notations of LTS. As usual q α→ q′ is used
for (q, a, q′) ∈→ and q α→ for ∃q′, q α→ q′. For a sub-alphabet Λ′ ⊆ Λ, a state q
of M is said Λ′-complete if ∀α ∈ Λ′ : q α→. It is complete if it is Λ-complete. The
ioLTS M is Λ′-complete (resp. complete) if all its states are Λ′-complete (resp.
complete). Note that these completeness conditions can be deﬁned on ioSTS: an
ioSTSM is Σ′-complete for Σ′ ⊆ Σ, if for any a ∈ Σ′, the predicate ∧(a,p,G,A)∈T ¬G
is unsatisﬁable (otherwise said ∀a ∈ Σ′,∨(a,p,G,A)∈T G = true).
Runs and traces.
The behavior of an ioSTS is deﬁned by its ioLTS semantics. A run of an ioSTS
M is an alternate sequence of states and valued actions ρ = q0α0q1 . . . αn−1qn ∈
Q0.(Λ.Q)∗ s.t. ∀i, qi αi→ qi+1. The run ρ is accepted in F ⊆ Q if qn ∈ F .
Runs(M) denotes the set of runs of M and RunsF (M) is the set of accepted
runs in F . When modelling the testing activity, we consider abstractions of runs
where states are abstracted away, as variables and locations cannot be observed
by the environment. A trace of a run ρ ∈ Runs(M) is the projection projΛ(ρ) of
ρ on actions. Traces(M)  projΛ(Runs(M)) denotes the set of traces of M and
TracesF (M)  projΛ(RunsF (M)) is the set of traces of runs accepted in F .
For the sake of simplicity, we restrict to deterministic ioSTS, where an ioSTS
M = (V,Θ,Σ, T ) is deterministic if for any action a ∈ Σ, and any pair of transitions
t1 = (a,p, G1, A1) and t2 = (a,p, G2, A2) carrying the same action, the conjunction
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of the guards G1∧G2 is unsatisﬁable. In fact, it is not always possible to transform
an ioSTS into a deterministic one having the same set of traces. However, a class
of ioSTS as been identiﬁed which can be determinized eﬀectively [18].
When testing for conformance, one is interested in comparing the observable
behavior, thus traces of the implementation with the ones of the speciﬁcation. Ad-
ditionally, one can also observe quiescences of the implementation, and check that
they are allowed by the speciﬁcation. A quiescence occurs when no output is ﬁre-
able: the system is blocked unless the environment provides an input. A particular
case is a deadlock, i.e., when additionally no input is ﬁreable. As quiescence is not
preserved by determinization (the same trace can lead to a quiescent and a non-
quiescent state), this information has to be computed before determinization. The
corresponding transformation called suspension was originally deﬁned for ioLTS [25],
and here denoted Δ. It consists in adding a self loop labelled with a new output
δ in every quiescent state. Suspension is here deﬁned directly for ioSTS with the
expected eﬀect on the ioLTS semantics (i.e. Δ(M) = Δ(M)):
Deﬁnition 2.4 [ioSTS suspension] For an ioSTS M = (V,Θ,Σ, T ) with alphabet
Σ = Σ! ∪ Σ?, the suspension of M is the ioSTS Δ(M) = (V,Θ,Σδ, Tδ) where:
• the alphabet is increased by a new output: Σδ = Σδ! ∪ Σ? with Σδ! = Σ! ∪ {δ},
• new loop transitions labelled by δ are added: Tδ = T ∪ {〈δ,Gδ, IdV 〉} with
Gδ = ¬
⎛
⎝ ∨
(a,p,G,A)∈T, a∈Σ!
∃π ∈ Dsig(a) : G(ν,π)
⎞
⎠
The guard Gδ associated to δ evaluates to true exactly when there is no valuation
of variables and communication parameters such that an output can be ﬁred.
The deﬁnition of suspension leads to the the observable behavior considered for
testing of an ioSTS M can be deﬁned as the traces of its suspension Δ(M). The
set Traces(Δ(M)) will be denoted by STraces(M). These suspension traces are the
reference for conformance testing and will thus be central in the deﬁnition of the
conformance relation.
Example 2.5 For the lift-controller example, Fig. 1 describes the suspension au-
tomaton, with δ actions with guards true in states Wait (no output is ﬁrebale) and
End (deadlock).
3 Conformance testing theory
Conformance testing consists in checking that an implementation exhibits an ob-
servable behavior consistent with its speciﬁcation. In order to formalize this, one
has to ﬁx models for speciﬁcations, implementations and test cases:
• The speciﬁcation is a deterministic ioSTS S = (V S ,ΘS ,Σ, TS), with Σ = Σ! ∪Σ?
and V Sx = ∅ (S has only internal variables). Its ioLTS semantics is S = S =
(Q,Q0,Λ,→) with Λ = Λ! ∪ Λ?.
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• Implementations are unknown, except for their interfaces and are not models but
real systems. However, in order to reason about conformance, implementations
are assumed to behave as models. The implementation is modelled by a (possibly
non-deterministic) ioLTS I = (QI , Q0I ,Λ! ∪ Λ?,→I) having the same interface as
S. I is assumed to be Λ?-complete 3 . Δ(I) denotes its suspension ioLTS.
• A test case for the speciﬁcation ioSTS S is a deterministic ioSTS T C =
(V TC ,ΘTC ,ΣTC , TTC ), where ΣTC? = Σ! and Σ
TC
! = Σ? (actions are mir-
rored w.r.t. S), equipped with a variable Verdict ∈ V TC of the enumerated
type {none, fail, pass, inconc}. Intuitively, fail means rejection, pass means
that some targeted behaviour has been reached (this will be clariﬁed later) and
inconc means that targeted behaviours cannot been reached anymore. T C is
assumed to be ΣTC? -complete in all states where Verdict = none. This means that
T C is ready to react to any output of the implementation, except when a ver-
dict is reached and the execution stops. TC = T C = (QTC , qTC0 ,ΛTC ,→TC )
denotes the ioLTS semantics of T C. The predicates Fail = (Verdict = fail),
Pass = (Verdict = pass), and Inconc = (Verdict = inconc) denote the subsets of
QTC where verdicts are emitted.
We are now ready to formalize conformance. We consider the ioco conformance
relation [25] which says that after any suspension trace of the speciﬁcation, outputs
(or quiescences) of the implementation must be speciﬁed. We here adopt a deﬁnition
where non-conformant suspension traces are explicit:
Deﬁnition 3.1 [Conformance] Let S be a speciﬁcation, and I be an implementa-
tion of S. The ioco conformance relation is deﬁned as:
I ioco S  STraces(I) ∩NC STraces(S) = ∅
where NC STraces(S) = STraces(S) · (Λ! ∪ {δ}) \ STraces(S) is the set of minimal
(with respect to the preﬁx order) non-conformant suspension traces.
Example 3.2 For the lift-controller with constant h = 10, the suspen-
sion trace δ!.Target?(5).Up!(0).Up!(1).Up!(2).Up!(3).Up!(4).Stop!(5) is conformant,
while Target?(5).Up!(0).Up(1).Up(2).Down!(3).Up!(2).Up(3).Up(4).Stop!(5) is not
as the lift is not supposed to go down if the lift is lower than the target level.
The deﬁnition of conformance exhibits the fact that conformance is a safety
property: it can be violated by a ﬁnite trace. As usual, the negation of this safety
property can be deﬁned by an observer which recognizes the non-confomant sus-
pension traces NC STraces(S), giving rise to the deﬁnition of the canonical tester:
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Canonical Tester] Let S = (V S ,ΘS ,Σ, TS) be a deterministic
ioSTS and Δ(S) = (V S ,ΘS ,Σδ, TSδ ) its suspension. The canonical tester for S
is the (deterministic) ioSTS Can(S) = (V Can ,ΘCan ,ΣCan , TCan) such that:
• V Can = V S ∪ {Verdict} where Verdict is of the enumerated type {none, fail}
3 This ensures that the composition of I with a test case TC never blocks because of non-implemented
inputs.
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• ΘCan = ΘS ∧ Verdict = none;
• ΣCan? = Σ
δ
! and Σ
Can
! = Σ? (the alphabet is mirrored w.r.t. Δ(S))
• TCan is deﬁned by the rules:
t ∈ TΔ(S)
t ∈ TCan (Keep T
S)
a ∈ Σδ! = ΣCan? Ga =
∧
(a,p,G,A)∈TΔ(S) ¬G[
a(p) : Ga(v,p) ?Verdict′ := fail
] ∈ TCan (Input-completion)
Example 3.4 The canonical tester of the lift-controller is described in Fig. 2. First
the inputs and outputs are reversed compared to S and new transitions to a Fail
location have been added, labelled with actions with negations of the guards of
transitions in S, e.g., from the Move location, the transition carrying Up!(p) is
guarded by c < g ∧ p = c in S, and a new transition to Fail carrying Up!(p) and
guarded by c ≥ g ∨ p = c is added in Can(S).
Waitc = g = 0 Move End
Fail
0 ≤ p ≤ h
Target!(p)
g := pδ?
Stop?(p)
Break?
Up?(p)
Down?(p)
c = g ∧ p = c
Stop?(p)
c < g ∧ p = c
Up?(p)
c := c + 1
c > g ∧ p = c
Down?(p)
c := c− 1
Break?
δ?
c 	= g ∨ p 	= c, Stop?(p)
c ≥ g ∨ p 	= c, Up?(p)
c ≤ g ∨ p 	= c,Down?(p)
δ?
Stop?(p)
Break?
Up?(p)
Down?(p)
Fig. 2. Canonical tester
Can(S) is a test case by itself: it is deterministic and ΣCan? -complete in all
states where Verdict = none. Moreover Can(S) exactly recognizes non-conformant
behaviours in its Fail states, as TracesFail(Can(S)) = NC STraces(S). Conformance
can then be expressed using the canonical tester:
I ioco S ⇐⇒ STraces(I) ∩ TracesFail(Can(S)) = ∅
If I was known, checking non-conformance would be simple. However, as I is
unknown, complete veriﬁcation is impossible and one has to experiment the im-
plementation with selected test cases. The canonical tester will play a central roˆle
in this selection. Test cases will have to satisfy some properties. In order to de-
ﬁne these, the execution of a test case on an (model of) implementation must be
formalized ﬁrst.
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Let I be an implementation with Δ(I) = (QI , QI0,Λ! ∪ {δ} ∪ Λ?,→Δ(I)) its
suspension, and TC = (QTC , qTC0 ,Λ? ∪ Λ! ∪ {δ},→TC ) the ioLTS semantics of an
ioSTS test case T C. The test execution of TC on I is modelled by the parallel
composition of Δ(I) and TC , an ioLTS Δ(I)‖TC = (QI ×QTC , QI0 × {qTC0 },Λ! ∪
{δ} ∪ Λ?,→Δ(I)‖TC ) where →Δ(I)‖TC , is deﬁned by the rule:
α ∈ Λ! ∪ {δ} ∪ Λ? q1 α→Δ(I) q2 q′1 α→TC q′2
(q1, q′1)
α→Δ(I)‖TC (q2, q′2)
It then follows that
Traces(Δ(I)‖TC ) = STraces(I) ∩ Traces(TC ) = STraces(I) ∩ Traces(T C)
For P ∈ {Fail,Pass, Inconc}, one also gets
TracesQI×P (Δ(I)‖TC ) = STraces(I) ∩ TracesP (TC )
The main result of the execution of a test case on an implementation is the verdict
that it emits. As this execution is not fully determined due to non-controlable
choices made by the implementation, this execution may result in several traces.
We then formalize the potential failure of a test case on an implementation as the
fact that one of these executions may lead to a Fail verdict:
TC mayfail I  TracesQI×Fail(Δ(I)‖TC ) = ∅
which is equivalent to STraces(I) ∩ TracesFail(TC ) = ∅.
Test case properties:
Basic properties are essential to guarantee that selected test cases are related to
the conformance relation. A set of test cases TS is said complete if it is both sound
and exhaustive where:
• TS is sound  ∀I : (I ioco S =⇒ ∀TC ∈ TS : ¬(TC mayfail I)), i.e., only
non-conformant implementations may be rejected by a test case in TS .
• TS is exhaustive  ∀I : (¬(I ioco S) =⇒ ∃TC ∈ TS : TC mayfail I), i.e., any
non-conformant implementation may be rejected by a test case in TS .
As TC mayfail I ⇐⇒ STraces(I) ∩ TracesFail(TC ) = ∅ and I ioco S ⇐⇒
STraces(I)∩TracesFail(Can(S)) = ∅ these properties can be related to the canonical
tester as follows:
TS is sound iﬀ
⋃
TC∈TS TracesFail(TC ) ⊆ TracesFail(Can(S)),
TS is exhaustive iﬀ
⋃
TC∈TS TracesFail(TC ) ⊇ TracesFail(Can(S)).
This means that sound test cases are sub-observers of the canonical tester, and
that an exhaustive test suite should capture exactly the same non-conformant be-
haviors as the canonical tester. Clearly, the canonical tester is by itself a complete
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test case. In some sense, this is the idea used in the TorX tool [2] for on-line test-
ing for ioLTS models: the tool either non-deterministically chooses an input of the
canonical tester to feed the implementation or checks that the outputs produced by
the implementation does not reach Fail in the canonical tester, or stops by giving a
Pass verdict. Traces of these executions form sound test cases, but exhaustiveness
is in general lost when considering ﬁnite executions.
In oﬀ-line test selection, one renounces to exhaustiveness and selects test cases
among all possible sound ones. The non-deterministic algorithm of [25] can then be
understood as the production of a test case by an unfolding of the canonical tester.
As will be seen later, one can also use test purposes to select test cases that focus
on some particular behaviors. In both cases, even if exhaustiveness is lost by any
ﬁnite set of test cases, one can still prove that the (inifnite) set of all test cases that
could be produced is exhaustive. which guarantees that for any non-conformant
implementation, there is a possibility to detect it by one test case produced by the
algorithm.
4 Test selection
The test selection algorithm proposed in this paper is based on the notion of test
purpose. In practice, a test purpose attached to a test case speciﬁes the intention
of the test case. The formalization of a test purpose by an ioSTS observer allows
to specify abstract behaviors one is interested to test.
Deﬁnition 4.1 [Test purpose] For a speciﬁcation S = (V,Θ,Σ = Σ! ∪ Σ?, T ), a
Test Purpose is a deterministic ioSTS T P = (V TP ,ΘTP ,Σδ, TTP ) such that:
• V TPx = V Si : test purposes are allowed to observe the internal state of S;
• V TPi ∩V Si = ∅ and V TPi contains a program counter variable pcTP with accept ∈
DpcTP . Its set of accepting states is Accept = (pcTP = accept).
• T P should be complete except when pcTP = accept, which means that for any
action a ∈ Σδ, pcTP = accept⇒ ∨(a,p,G,A)∈TTP G = true. This ensures that T P
does not restrict the runs of S before they are accepted (if ever).
Example 4.2 A test purpose for the lift-controller is described by Fig. 3. The
dashed transitions are those that are automatically added by the STG tool, e.g.,
loops in locations labelled by actions that do not appear as outgoing transitions,
and transitions to a Sink location guarded by the negation of the union of guards
of the same action in outgoing transitions. The intention of this test purpose is to
select behaviors where a ﬁrst Stop(p) occurs at a certain level l storing the value of
p, and a second Stop(p) occurs at a level p which is exactly the half of l (2p = l),
and less than the third of h (3p ≥ h). One immediately notice that l should be
even.
A test purpose, with its set of accepting states allows to recognize behaviors
of the speciﬁcation. More precisely, it allows to recognize runs. In the case of
automata or ioLTS, a synchronous product is used to capture this idea. Similarly,
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S1l = 0 S2 Accept
Sink
Stop!(p)
l := p
Σδ \ Stop!(p)
2p = l ∧ 3p ≤ h
Stop!(p)
2p 	= l ∨ 3p > h
Stop!(p)
Σδ \ Stop!(p)
Fig. 3. A test purpose
a synchronous product for ioSTS can be deﬁned. This synchronous product is here
specialized for the canonical tester Can(S) = (V Can ,ΘCan ,Σδ, TCan) and a test
purpose T P = (V TP ,ΘTP ,Σδ, TTP ) with V TPx = V Cani :
The synchronous product of Can(S) and T P is the ioSTS P = Can(S) × T P =
(V P ,ΘP ,ΣCan , TP ) where:
• V P = V Pi ∪ V Px , with V Pi = V Cani ∪ V TPi and V Px = ∅;
• ΘP (〈vCan ,vTP 〉) = ΘCan(vCan) ∧ΘTP (vTP );
• TP is deﬁned by the following inference rule:
[ a(p) : Gc(vc,p) ? (vci )
′ := Ac(vc,p) ] ∈ TCan
[
a(p) : Gt(vt,p) ? (vti)
′ := At(vt,p)
] ∈ TTP
[
a(p) : Gc(vc,p) ∧Gt(vt,p) ?
(vci )
′ := Ac(vc,p), (vti)
′ := At(vt,p)
] ∈ TP
We denote P ′ the ioSTS obtained by adding the assignment Verdict := pass to all
transitions with assignment pc′ := accept.
Example 4.3 The synchronous product S×T P for the lift controller is represented
in Fig. 4. For simplicity, we did not represent the ioSTS for P ′ = Can(S) × T P.
P ′ would have the same structure, plus transitions to a Fail location labelled with
actions with negations of guards of outgoing transitions in S×T P as in the canonical
tester.
As T P is non-intrusive (it observes but does not modify variables of S), one gets
Traces(P ′) ⊆ Traces(Can(S)) and TracesFail(P ′) = Traces(P ′)∩TracesFail(Can(S))
This means that P ′ detects every non-conformance along its traces. It is thus a
sound test case. One also gets
TracesPass(P ′) = TracesAccept(P) ⊆ STraces(S) ∩ TracesAccept(T P)
The inclusion becomes an equality if T P does not observe variables of S.
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Wait
S1
c = g = 0
l = 0
Move
S1
Wait
S2
Move
S2
Wait
Accept
End
S1
End
S2
Wait
Sink
0 ≤ p ≤ h
Target!(p)
g := p
δ?
c < g ∧ p = c
Up?(p)
c := c + 1
c > g ∧ p = c
Down?(p)
c := c− 1
c = g ∧ p = c
Stop?(p)
l := p
0 ≤ p ≤ h
Target!(p)
g := p
δ?
c < g ∧ p = c
Up?(p)
c := c + 1
c > g ∧ p = c
Down?(p)
c := c− 1
c = g ∧ p = c ∧
2p = l ∧ 3p ≤ h
Stop?(p)
verdict := Pass
c = g ∧ p = c ∧
(2p = l ∨ 3p > h)
Stop?(p)
Break?
δ? δ?
Fig. 4. Synchronous product S × T P
Note that P ′ has two distinguished roˆles: it is both an observer of non-
conformant suspension traces with its Fail states, and an observer of the abstract
behaviors one wants to test with its Pass states. But no test selection has been
performed yet. An ideal selection would mean to select TracesPass(P ′), and, along
these traces, unspeciﬁed outputs leading to Fail. However, systems are not fully
controllable: outputs are not fully determined by inputs because of choices made
by the system. This entails that all speciﬁed outputs have to be considered after
a trace: outputs from which Pass is reachable or Fail is reached, but also outputs
after which Pass is not reachable anymore, which is denoted by the Inconc verdict
And in this last case, one would like to detect the divergence as soon as possible,
i.e., on the ﬁrst output where this occurs.
This amounts to computing the set of states from which Pass is reachable,
denoted coreach(Pass), which is the least ﬁx-point of an monotonic function in
the lattice 2Q of subsets of Q: coreach(Pass) = lfp(λX.Pass ∪ pre(X)) where
pre(X) = {q | ∃q′ ∈ X, ∃α ∈ Λ : q α→ q′} is the set of states from which X
can be reached in one transition.
In the case of ﬁnite ioLTS, coreach(Pass) is easily computed with graph algo-
rithms (computation of strongly connected components), as implemented in the
TGV tool [14]. However the set coreach(Pass) is not computable for ioSTS. A
solution then consists in computing an over-approximation. This is the idea used in
the STG tool, with the help of the NBAC tool, a veriﬁcation tool based on abstract
interpretation. How this computation is performed by NBAC is not detailled (other
techniques and tools could compute such an approximation) but we assume that
an over-approximation has been computed, and explain how this approximation
is used in the selection of test cases. The main idea of test selection is to trans-
form P ′ = (V P ′ ,ΘP ′ ,ΣCan , TP ′) together with its set of Fail and Pass states into a
test case T C, by reinforcing the guards of transitions of P ′ in order to try to stay
in coreach(Pass). As this set is not computable, this set and thus the guards are
over-approximated.
Given a set of states X ∈ Dv represented by a formula X(v), let pre(A)(X)(v,p)
denote the precondition of X by an assignment A : Dv ×Dp → Dv:
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pre(A)(X)(v,p) = ∃v′ : X(v′) ∧ v′ = A(v,p) = X(A(v,p))
In other words, pre(A)(X)(v,p) represents the set of values of variables v and
parameters p from which X is reached after the assignment A. Note that the
operator pre(A) is monotone. Assume that one can compute a monotone over-
approximationpreα(A)(X) ⊇ pre(A)(X) of pre(A)(X).
Assume now that an over-approximation coreachα of coreach(Pass) has been
computed. This computation typicaly uses the operation preα(A)(X), together
with a widening operator which guarantees the termination of ﬁx-point iterations.
We assume that coreachα is represented by a predicate.
The predicate preα(A)(coreachα) is then an over-approximation of the set of
values for variables and parameters which allow to stay in coreach(Pass) when tak-
ing a transition (a,p, G,A). In other words it is a necessary condition to stay in
coreach(Pass). Its negation is thus a suﬃcient condition to leave coreach(Pass). We
use this to reinforce the guards and compute a test case from P ′.
The test case for S and T P is the ioSTS T C = (V P ′ ,ΘP ′ ,ΣCan , T T C) where
T T C is deﬁned from P ′ by the three rules:
(a,p, G,A) ∈ TP ′ a ∈ ΣCan!
G′ = preα(A)(coreachα)
(a,p, G ∧G′, A) ∈ TT C
(Select)
(a,p, G,A) ∈ TP ′ a ∈ ΣCan? AVerdict = Verdict′ := fail
(a,p, G,A) ∈ TT C (Fail)
(a,p, G,A) ∈ TP ′ a ∈ ΣCan? AVerdict 	= Verdict′ := fail
G′ = preα(A)(coreachα)
(a,p, G ∧G′, A), (a,p, G ∧ ¬G′, A′) ∈ TT C
where A′ is deﬁned by
(
A′Verdict = Verdict
′ := inconc,
A′v = Av for v 	= Verdict,
(Split)
The transformation treats inputs and outputs diﬀerently, because the tester
controls its outputs, but only observes its inputs. The ﬁrst rule (Select) is for
outputs. It consists in reinforcing the guard with G′ = preα(A)(coreachα) in order
to keep a chance to stay in coreach(Pass) after the transition. Implicitly this rule
forbids all outputs that would certainly leave coreach(Pass). The two other rules
are concerned with non-controlable inputs. The ﬁrst one (Fail) keeps all transitions
with Fail verdict. The second splits transitions labelled with inputs into two new
transitions: one by which we may stay in coreach(Pass) by reinforcing the guard
with G′, the other one by which we are sure to leave coreach(Pass) by reinforcing
the guard with the negation of G′. In this second case an Inconc verdict is set.
The test case can be further simpliﬁed with an over-approximation reachα(ΘP
′
)
of its reachable states reach(ΘP
′
) where reach(ΘP
′
) = lfp(λX.ΘP
′ ∪ post(X)) with
post(X) = {q′ | ∃q ∈ X, ∃α ∈ Λ : q α→ q′} being the set of states reachable from
X in one transition. The simpliﬁcation consists in removing transitions of which
the guards are unsatisﬁable in the over-approximation reachα(ΘP
′
) of the set of
reachable states i.e., transitions (a,p, G,A) where G ∧ reachα(ΘP ′) simpliﬁes to
false. Note that, this transformation is purely syntactic: it does not modify the
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semantics of TC as it only removes infeasible transitions.
Example 4.4 The results of the backward and forward analysis computed by the
NBAC tool are described in the following table:
location coreachα reachα
Wait, S1 h ≥ 0 c = g = 0
Move, S1 3g ≤ 2h 0 ≤ c ≤ g ∧ 3g ≤ 2h
End, S1 false 0 ≤ c ≤ h ∧ c ≤ g + l ≤ h + c ∧ 0 ≤ l ≤ h ∧ 0 ≤ g ≤ h
Wait, S2 3c ≤ 2h 0 ≤ c = g = l ∧ 3c ≤ 2h
Move, S2 3g ≤ h g ≤ c ≤ 2g = l ∧ 3g ≤ h
End, S2 false 0 ≤ c ≤ 2g ∧ g ≤ 2h ∧ 3c ≤ 2h
Wait, Sink false false
Wait, Accept true 0 ≤ c = g ∧ 2c = l ∧ 3c ≤ h
Notice that the analysis is not exact as the fact that the ﬁrst target level should
be even is lost: NBAC is not able to infer this as it restricts its analysis to polyhedra,
and parity is not a linear constraint.
As a consequence of these analyses, the resulting test case is computed, as shown
in Fig. 5 (for clarity, transitions to Fail are not represented but can be obtained
by complementation of guards). The coreachability analysis allows to constraint
the guards of transitions. In particular for outputs, the ﬁrst transition carrying
Target(p) is enforced by 3p ≤ 2h as preα(g := p)(3g ≤ 2h) = 3p ≤ 2h, and the
second one by 3p ≤ h ∧ 2p = l as preα(g := p)(g ≤ c ≤ 2g = l ∧ 3g ≤ h∧) = 3p ≤
h ∧ 2p = l.
The reachability analysis then allows to cut non-ﬁreable transitions. In location
Move, S1 (resp. Move, S2) the transition carrying Down?(p) (resp. Up?(p)) is not
ﬁreable as its guard c > g∧p = c (resp. c < g∧p = c) is unsatisﬁable when 0 ≤ c ≤ g
(resp. g ≤ c ≤ 2g). Similarly the guard c = g ∧ p = c ∧ 2p = l ∨ 3p > h of the
transition from Move, S2 to Wait, Sink is unsatisﬁable when g ≤ c ≤ 2g ∧ 3g ≤ h.
Properties of selected test cases
As expected, it can be proved that the (inﬁnite) set of test cases that can be
produced by the test selection algorithm is sound and exhaustive. Soundness directly
comes from the soundness of Can(S), which is preserved by synchronous product
and selection (these transformation do not add any trace leading to Fail). For
exhaustiveness, the idea is, for any non-conformant trace σ.a ∈ NC STraces(()S) =
TracesFail(Can(S)), to identify a test purpose T P for which the selection produces
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Wait
S1
c = g = 0
l = 0
Move
S1
Wait
S2
Move
S2
Wait
Accept
End
S1/S2
0 ≤ p ≤ h
∧3p ≤ 2h
Target!(p)
g := p
δ?
c < g ∧ p = c
Up?(p)
c := c + 1
Break?
verdict := Inconc
c = g ∧ p = c
∧ 3c ≤ 2h
Stop?(p)
l := p
0 ≤ p ≤ h∧
3p ≤ h ∧ 2p = l
Target!(p)
g := p
δ?
c > g ∧ p = c
Down?(p)
c := c− 1
c = g ∧ p = c∧
2p = l ∧ 3p ≤ h
Stop?(p)
verdict := Pass
Fig. 5. Selected test case
a test case T C such that σ.a ∈ TracesFail(T C). One chooses an output b such that
σ.b /∈ TracesFail(Can(S)) (the existence of b is ensured as Can(S) has no quiescence),
and builds an test purpose accepting σ.b. By construction the test case T C built
from T P then reaches Fail for the trace σ.a.
Apart soundness and exhaustiveness which relate Fail verdicts to conformance,
other properties related to verdicts Pass and Inconc are also of importance as they
relate test cases to the selection means, namely test purposes. It can be proved that
Pass verdicts are always exact: a Pass is always emitted when the current trace is
accepted by the test purpose. The only verdict where the over-approximation may
cause a lost in precision is Inconc. In fact, it may be the case that some traces of
T C are not anymore a preﬁx of an accepted trace, but is not detected as such. It
will either be detected by continuation of the trace, or will loop. It is easy to see
that the precision of the approximation directly inﬂuences the ability of test cases
to emit Inconc verdicts accurately. For the reader familiar with structural testing,
the problem of detecting Inconc verdicts is similar to the classical problem of the
undecidability of the feasability of a path in structural testing, which is known to
be undecidable.
5 Test execution
In most test generation techniques, generated test cases are completely instanciated
test cases in the form of sequences (in the deterministic case), trees or graphs where
actions carry some valued parameters. In our case, generated test cases are kinds of
programs described as ioSTS, thus have variables, guards, actions and assignments.
During test execution, the test harness will start the test case with its unique initial
state. Then the system will progress with transitions carrying either inputs or
outputs. The tester can choose a transition carrying an output if one is ﬁreable. In
this case, as values of variables are known, it should choose a value of parameters
such that the guard is satisﬁable. This is where satisﬁability of guards should be
decidable. If there is none, an input (or quiescence should be observed). The choice
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of parameters values should be done by constraint solving. An input is ﬁreable
only if it is sent by the implementation under test. The tester then has to check,
according to the current value of variables and the value of the input parameters,
which guard is satisﬁable among transitions carrying this input. As the test case is
input-complete in any state with no verdict, exactly one transition is ﬁreable.
Example 5.1 In the lift-controller example, the execution proceeds as follows. Let
us ﬁx the constant h = 10. The tester chooses a value for p for Target such that
0 ≤ p ≤ 10 ∧ 3p ≤ 20. Assume that 4 is chosen, then the tester will observe the
trace Up?(0).Up?(1).Up?(2).Up?(3).Stop?(4) if the implementation conforms to S
but does not emit Break. The tester will then choose 2 as the unique solution of
the guard 0 ≤ p ≤ 10 ∧ 2p = 4 ∧ 3p ≤ 20. The lift will then go down and the tester
is supposed to observe Down?(4).Down?(3).Stop?(2).
If 3 was chosen as a solution to 0 ≤ p ≤ 10 ∧ 3p ≤ 20 for the ﬁrst level to
reach, the tester would observe Up?(0).Up?(1).Up?(2).Stop?(3). After that, there
is no solution to 0 ≤ p ≤ 10 ∧ 2p = 5 ∧ 3p ≤ 20 and the tester can only observe a
quiescence ?δ. This situation is due to the approximation, as the constraint on the
ﬁrst Target does not ensure that p is even.
6 Conclusion and perspectives
This paper proposes an approach to the oﬀ-line selection of test cases from speci-
ﬁcation models with control and data (ioSTS) using test purposes. This technique
avoids the state explosion problem due to the enumeration of data values and pro-
duces test cases on the form of programs. Test selection reduces to syntactical opera-
tions on these models and relies on an over-approximate analysis of the co-reachable
states to a target location. During execution of test cases on the implementation,
constraint solving is used to choose output data values. For simplicity, the theory
exposed in this paper is restricted to deterministic speciﬁcations. However, non-
determnistic speciﬁcations can be taken into account with some restrictions [18].
In our perspectives of this work, more powerful models of systems with features
such as time, recursion and concurrency should be considered. A similar approach
has been developed for stack automata modeling recursive programs and test pur-
poses speciﬁed as automata [7]. In this case, the analyses are exact, but cannot
be fully used if test cases cannot observe their own stack, thus also inducing an
approximation. For test generation, one problem to address in these models is par-
tial observability, which, as for ioSTS, entails the identiﬁcation of determinizable
sub-classes corresponding to applications.
Other challenges are the combination of these techniques with coverage-based
test selection. One direction should be to use the dynamic partitioning facility
provided by the tool Nbac used by STG as an aid for test selection with respect
to coverage criteria with a deeper semantic meaning. More generally, conformance
testing appeals for more semantic based coverage criteria.
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